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At the beginning of the twentieth century, Leon Trotsky observed the particular way 
Russia was integrated into the world economy. Responding to military pressures by 
advanced Western countries, Russia, still based on feudal social relations, had 
embarked on a policy of industrialisation with a focus on production related to 
military needs. Financed mainly by foreign capital, small, highly concentrated pockets 
of advanced industry were combined with traditional social forms of organisation in 
feudal Russia. These were the conditions of ‘uneven and combined development’ 
(Trotsky, 1906/2007, p.27; Trotsky, 1929/2007, p.196; Trotsky, 1932/2008, p.8). 
Trotsky’s participant-witness analysis of Russia in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century focused predominantly on the role of foreign lending and 
investment in the industrialisation of backward conditions. Capitalist expansion, 
however, through relations of uneven and combined development has also been 
pursued through so-called ‘free trade’ policies, used to open up other countries along 
these dynamics and integrate them into relations of unequal exchange. Uneven and 
combined development has experienced an increasing scholarly interest in recent 
years. This literature, however, has hardly attempted to engage with the role of 
‘unequal exchange’ and how it might relate to its considerations. The purpose of this 
article is to engage these dynamics and begin to consider how unequal exchange in 
‘free trade’ relations may be a key dynamic relating to overall processes of uneven 
and combined development. In the next section, we first discuss processes of uneven 
and combined development. Unequal exchange, in turn, is then dealt with in the 
second main section, before the specific role of ‘free trade’ is discussed. The 
conclusion briefly discusses the possibilities of labour’s agency in view of these 
dynamics.   
 
 
 3 
Uneven and combined development: caught up in catch-up? 
Recently, some of Trotsky’s points on the relationship between uneven and combined 
development and capitalism as a mode of production have once again been taken up. 
On one hand, Justin Rosenberg understands uneven and combined development as a 
transhistorical phenomenon and, thus, as intrinsic to the historical process itself 
(Rosenberg, 2006, p.309). In accord with the argument of Hannes Lacher (2006) and 
Benno Teschke (2003), he emphasises that capitalism emerged in an already existing 
international states-system. Because this inter-societal plurality precedes capitalism, 
he argues, such a transhistorical notion is necessary to an understanding of 
geopolitics. ‘The issue of the geopolitical cannot be fully grasped from within a 
theory of capital’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2010, p.171). Admittedly Trotsky 
(1929/2004, p.24) asserted that it is ‘necessary to understand this unevenness 
correctly, to consider it in its full extent, and also to extend it to the pre-capitalist 
past’. For Rosenberg, this justifies stretching uneven and combined development as a 
transhistorical essence, reaching ‘all the way back into the socio-ecological 
unevenness characterising the earliest forms of social existence’ (Rosenberg, 2010, 
p.186). On the other hand, Alex Callinicos accepts the relevance of uneven and 
combined development beyond the capitalist historical period but argues that its 
concrete dynamic within a specific historical period cannot be understood without 
reference to the dominant mode of production (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2010, 
p.176). Concurrent with Neil Smith (1984/2008, p.4) ‘uneven development is the 
systematic geographical expression of the contradictions inherent in the very 
constitution and structure of capital’ and thus unique to capitalism. If treated as a 
universal process, uneven and combined development can therefore be reduced to a 
triviality telling us very little about capitalism and capitalist restructuring (see Smith 
2006, p.182). 
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While the expansive dynamic of feudalism was driven by political 
accumulation, i.e. the conquering of new territories and people (Brenner, 1985b, 
p.238; Teschke, 2003, p.99), the specific economic pressures of competitiveness 
within capitalism as a mode of production can only be grasped through an 
understanding of the way exploitation is based on wage labour and the private 
ownership of the means of production. Robert Brenner, through a detailed focus on 
the organisation of social property relations, argues that it was in medieval England 
that capitalist social relations of production emerged first, based on a 
landlord/capitalist tenant/wage-labourer structure. This then led to a situation in which 
both landlord and tenant depended on the market for their social reproduction 
(Brenner, 1985a, p.46-9). Importantly, the specificity of this development was not 
linked to the emerging world market and the trade in luxury goods for mercantilist 
elites, but to the development of a unique domestic economy based on a growing 
mass market for cheap basic goods such as food stuffs and cotton cloth (Brenner, 
2001, p.233; Wood, 2002a, p.82). ‘This system was unique in its dependence on 
intensive as distinct from extensive expansion, on the extraction of surplus value 
created in production as distinct from profit in the sphere of circulation, on economic 
growth based on increasing productivity and competition within a single market—in 
other words, on capitalism’ (Wood, 2002b, p.23). And it was this dependence, which 
infused a dynamic of competitiveness into the production system, leading to constant 
technological innovation and increasing specialisation of production methods first in 
agriculture, then within the wider production of the industrial revolution. It is this 
dynamic, which fuels the relentless search for higher profit levels and makes 
capitalism such a dynamic production system. However, the inner logic of capitalism 
in this relentless search for higher rates of profit also implies that there is an inner 
tendency towards crisis. While the constant search for higher profits through the 
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introduction of new machinery and technology into the production process may be a 
logical thing to do for the individual capitalist, for capitalism as a whole it is 
disastrous. If all capitalists attempt to produce more goods at cheaper prices and with 
fewer workers, then eventually there will be a lack of demand for their products 
resulting in a crisis of overproduction. ‘Individual capitalists, in short, necessarily act 
in such a way as to de-stabilise capitalism’ (Harvey, 1982/2006, p.188). 
As Rosa Luxemburg pointed out, in order to ensure a constant increase in the 
accumulation of surplus value, capital relies on bringing non-capitalist spaces into the 
capitalist social relations of production in an outward expansionary dynamic, creating 
hothouse conditions for capital accumulation in non-capitalist environments 
(Luxemburg, 1913/2003, p.338). Hence a focus therein on processes of primitive 
accumulation in dispossessing peasant producers to create a reserve of labour power 
in non-capitalist territories based on the wage system; on the role of the non-capitalist 
world in absorbing commodities and surplus value; and on how states are drawn into 
the credit system to offset crisis conditions whilst subject to foreign interventionist, 
militarist, and imperialist relations. Ray Kiely engages critically with Luxemburg’s 
analysis of the outward dynamic of the capitalist mode of production. Historically, 
capitalist accumulation did not functionally depend on absorbing ever more non-
capitalist space. Before World War I, for example, most capital was invested in, and 
trade took place between, industrialised countries (Kiely, 2010, pp.79-81). And yet, at 
the same time, it is a fact that capitalism did expand outwardly in encompassing the 
whole globe. Already in 1848 Marx and Engels wrote about how capital overcomes 
periodic crises ‘on the one hand through the enforced destruction of a mass of 
productive forces; on the other through the capture of new markets and a more 
thoroughgoing exploitation of old ones’ (Marx and Engels, 1848/1998, p.18). The 
enforced destruction of productive forces and a more intensive exploitation of existing 
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capitalist social relations of production links to Kiely’s emphasis on developments 
internal to industrialised countries. The capture of new markets, however, refers to 
Luxemburg’s focus on outward expansion. In other words, we can summarise that 
while outward expansion is not the only way capital attempts to overcome crises, it is 
clearly one significant aspect to it.  
 In his discussions of uneven and combined development, Trotsky argued that 
backwardness in a general situation of unevenness can actually be an advantage. ‘The 
privilege of historic backwardnessand such a privilege existspermits, or rather 
compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping 
a whole series of intermediate stages’ (Trotsky, 1932/2008, p.4). The history of 
capitalist modernity expressed through conditions of uneven and combined 
development should not therefore be considered as an uninterrupted temporal 
sequence of stages. Added to the register of pathways to capitalist catch-up with 
England were instances of so-called ‘bourgeois revolutions from above’ in the cases 
of Germany, Italy, the United States, and Japan. The central feature of such bourgeois 
revolutions being the change brought about in the character of the state (Callinicos, 
1989, p.160). Neil Davidson adds the example of Scotland to these instances of catch-
up, able to draw on England’s earlier advances (Davidson, 2010, p.10). At the same 
time, though, he warns against generalising from the Scottish experience. ‘No other 
country would ever complete the transition from feudal agriculture to capitalist 
industrialisation so quickly or completely. The moment was too brief, the result so 
uniquely decisive, for any theoretical generalisation from this experience to be 
possible’ (Davidson, 2006a, p.13). In short, there are only a few examples of 
successful developmental catch-up, generally located in advanced capitalist spaces of 
the world economy. The more common forms of capitalist transitionin some cases 
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as instances of passive revolutionin the post-colonial world were experienced as a 
blocked form of dependent development (see Morton, 2010, pp.315-20; Morton, 
2011, pp.35-9). 
Chinese economic growth with double digit levels of increased GDP, year-on-
year, is very impressive. What this picture, however, overlooks is, first, that uneven 
and combined development as a key dynamic of capitalist social relations of 
production is not only taking place between countries and regions but also within 
countries (Davidson, 2010, pp.15-16). ‘They may have adopted the most modern 
forms of technology, industrial organisation and scientific thought in certain areas, but 
most of society remains at a much lower level’ (Davidson, 2006b, p.211). Hyper-
modern coastal regions are counterpoised to backward inland areas in China. 
Moreover, as for Gross National Income per head, for example, the gap between 
China and the U.S. is enormous. In 2010, ‘China’s $4,260 was only 9 percent of the 
U.S.’s $47,240. In order, to close the per capita gap in 30 years, Chinese GDP per 
head would have to grow about 10 percent per year for three decades, or expand to 
nearly 18 times its current size in that period’ (Hardy and Budd, 2011, pp.30-31). In 
short, developmental catch-up is the exception, while a continuation and extension of 
unevenness is the norm. 
 
Capitalist expansion and the dynamics of unequal exchange 
Samir Amin has investigated in detail the dynamics of uneven and combined 
development and how the related conditions of unequal exchange between countries 
can explain the limits of catch-up. Historically, he distinguishes two different periods 
in the outward expansion of capital, two different ways as to how peripheral spaces 
have been repeatedly integrated into the core of global capitalism. Initial efforts to 
offset the tendency of the rate of profit to fall revolved around: 1) enlarging markets 
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and exploiting new regions where the rate of surplus value was higher than at the 
centre, i.e. the outward expansion of capitalism as discussed by Luxemburg; and 2) 
reducing the cost of labour power and of constant capital, i.e. internal developments 
within the industrialised countries as highlighted by Kiely. From within such 
arguments the ‘fresh geographical extension of capitalism’s domain’ over peripheral 
spaces was established through the mechanism of primitive accumulation. ‘The 
characteristic feature of primitive accumulation, in contrast to normal expanded 
reproduction, is unequal exchange, that is, the exchange of products whose prices of 
production, in the Marxist sense, are unequal’ (Amin, 1976, p.187). Relations within 
the world capitalist system are thus marked by the extension of the capitalist market at 
the expense of precapitalist systems, enabling the absorption of the surplus, and 
increases in the average rate of profit (Amin, 1976, p.188).  
In the age of monopoly capitalism since 1945, i.e. the current phase of 
capitalism for Amin, expanded reproduction is possible not necessarily by integrating 
non-capitalist spaces, but through restructuring the way in which peripheral spaces are 
integrated within the global political economy. Through the export of capital, forms of 
production were established in peripheral spaces enjoying the advantage of low-wage 
costs. The tendency to overcome the contradiction between the capacity to produce 
and pressures that reduce the rate of profit was shifted to the plane of the world 
capitalist system. Three important structural changes furthered conditions of uneven 
development in the period of monopoly capitalism: (1) transnational capital operating 
on a world scale; (2) advances in technology transferring centrality to ultra-modern 
branches of activityatomic power, space research, electronicsrendering obsolete 
the classical modes of accumulation, characterised by increasing the organic 
composition of capital; and (3) the concentration of technological knowledge in 
transnational corporations (Amin, 1976, p.189). In relation to ultra-modern advances 
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in technology, the uneven development of the global political economy thus gets a 
‘second wind’ as peripheral spaces come to accept a new form of specialisation, 
emerging as producers of capital goods, but still lagging behind advanced capitalist 
centres (Amin, 1976, p.190). In these processes, the formation of monopolies and the 
exporting of capital changed the function of peripheral spaces of capitalism so that 
they ceased to export agricultural products only and became exporters of finished 
manufactured goods, the expression of capitalist development that was a result of 
investment of capital by advanced capitalist centres (Amin, 1976, pp.185-6). This 
export of capital, however, can never overcome the crisis tendency of capitalism 
completely. In centres of advanced capitalism, the export of capital gives rise to a 
return flow that exceeds it in volume so the excess surplus is absorbed in other ways, 
including military expenditure and state aid (Amin, 1976, pp.180-1). 
 
 The export of capital, while not enabling the surplus to be absorbed, 
serves to raise the rate of profit, since capital benefits from a rate of 
surplus value in the periphery that is higher than in its country of origin. 
But this transfer is largely concealed by the equalisation of the rate of 
profit on the world scale, which constitutes the essence of unequal 
exchange (Amin, 1976, pp.181). 
It is here, then, that the significance of unequal exchange begins to enter the picture, 
despite that literature being too extensive to be addressed fully here.
1
 One result is a 
‘sectoral unevenness in productivity’, based on the divergence of the organic 
composition of capital in peripheral spaces, when the capitalist mode of production 
has not taken hold of all the branches of production, as it has at the centres of 
capitalism, to result in sectoral differences that mark the principal aspect of 
unevenness in the so-called ‘Third World’ (Amin, 1976, pp.215, 217-18). 
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‘These unevennesses of productivity are often reflected in unequal rates 
of profit, but also in unequal rewards of labour, especially where sectors 
that do not belong to the capitalist mode are concerned, as is often the 
case with rural production. This price structure has, therefore, nothing 
rational about it from the standpoint of the needs of a growth organised in 
order to put an end to the historical lagging-behinduneven between one 
sector and anotherwhich is characteristic of the periphery’ (Amin, 
1976, pp.223-4). 
Further, in order to counteract the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
capital imports labour from abroad at a lower wage, reserving the most thankless tasks 
for this labour whilst depressing the labour market more generally. ‘This additional 
immigrant labour force constitutes also a disguised transfer of value from the 
periphery to the centre, since the periphery has borne the costs of training this labour 
force’ (Amin, 1976, p.362). 
 In sum, the continuity and intensification of different productivity rates 
between developed and developing countries and, thereby, unequal exchange, is 
ensured through the ‘second wind’ of uneven and combined development.  
 
The new ‘free trade’ agenda and uneven development 
So far in previous sections, it has been concluded that capitalist expansion has taken 
place through processes of uneven and combined development. Uneven development 
constituted in two different periods of capitalist expansion, in turn, has locked 
countries into relations of unequal exchange, furthering the transfer of surplus value 
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from the periphery to countries in the core on the basis of different productivity rates. 
In this section, the focus is on the role of free trade in these processes.  
 In a liberal understanding of capitalist development, free trade is regarded as a 
win-win situation, a positive-sum game. As David Ricardo famously argued, if every 
country concentrates on producing and exporting what it is best at, i.e. on its 
comparative advantage, and imports all the other necessities, an optimum outcome 
with everybody benefiting will be the result (Kiely, 2007, pp.13-16). However, reality 
has unmasked the false promises of liberal economic thinking. Trade liberalisation has 
often implied deindustrialisation and import dependence. An analysis of the 
consequences of trade liberalisation in Africa and Latin America during the 1980s and 
1990s, for example, reveals widespread job losses, increasing unemployment and 
declining wages in both continents (War on Want, 2009, pp.5-13). As Anwar Shaikh 
makes clear, rather than drawing on the notion of ‘comparative advantage’, it is 
necessary to refer to the concept of ‘competitive advantage’, when analysing the 
underlying dynamics of free trade. 
 
There are no magic mechanisms that will automatically make all regions 
(nations) automatically equal. Indeed, persistent trade imbalances 
covered by foreign capital flows are the “normal” complement of 
international trade between unequally competitive trade partners. Thus, 
free trade does not make all nations equally competitive, as is argued 
within standard trade theory. Rather, it exposes the weak to the 
competition of the strong. And as in most such cases, the latter devour 
the former (Shaikh, 2007, p.57).  
Historical evidence confirms that developed countries relied heavily on protectionism 
and did not abide by patent laws in their own development. ‘They generally 
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championed free trade only when it was to their economic advantage’ (Shaikh, 2007, 
p.60). Market leaders, often in areas of new technology, have a competitive advantage 
and are, therefore, interested in ‘free trade’ and ‘open competition’. Developing 
countries, on the other hand generally operate in ‘old industries’. So-called ‘free 
trade’ intensifies these imbalances in trade and production (Kiely, 2007, p.18). 
 Immanuel Wallerstein has linked unequal exchange to ‘free trade’. Unequal 
exchange is considered to be the result of the appropriation of surplus value by 
countries in core capitalist spaces from countries in peripheral capitalist spaces on the 
basis of monopoly production.  
 
When exchange occurs, competitive products are in a weak position and 
quasi-monopolised products are in a strong position. As a result, there is 
a constant flow of surplus-value from the producers of peripheral 
products to the producers of core-like products. This has been called 
unequal exchange (Wallerstein, 2004, p.28). 
The key problem, however, is the way unequal exchange has been grounded within a 
definition of capitalist social relations of production linked to world-systems analysis. 
World-systems analysis explains the emergence of capitalism through a 
‘commercialisation model’ of capitalism based on market relations. Instead of 
focusing on the way production is organised on the basis of wage labour, the 
emphasis is on production for profit in a market (Wallerstein, 1974, p.399). As a 
result, world-systems analysis resides within a circulationist logic or in the political 
relations of distribution (Brenner, 1977; Teschke, 2003, p.139).  
 In order to understand the dynamics of capitalism, the focus has to be instead 
on the social relations of production. Similar to Amin’s focus on productivity 
differentials above, Ernest Mandel has also outlined how it is not the difference in the 
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nature of the goods that is the cause of unequal exchange, but rather the difference in 
the productivity of labour that is decisive (Mandel, 1975, pp.66, 359, 368). Of course, 
a monopoly position of a product also implies that the labour productivity of workers 
producing this particular product is very high. Nevertheless, ‘monopoly is one source 
of surplus profits, but much more important is technological innovation that, by 
increasing productivity, reduces the innovator’s costs of production below the sectoral 
average’ (Callinicos, 2010, p.23). A monopoly ensures the longer feasibility of higher 
productivity rates, but it is not in itself the cause of unequal exchange. Hence, ‘on the 
world market, the labour of a country with a higher productivity of labour is valued as 
more intensive, so that the product of one day’s work in such a nation is exchanged 
for the product of more than a day’s work in an underdeveloped country’ (Mandel, 
1975, pp.71-2). Different productivity rates, in turn, are however the result of 
historical uneven development. This confirms Shaikh’s understanding that unequal 
exchange is the result of uneven development, but not its cause. ‘Since uneven 
development on a world scale is a direct consequence of free trade itself, these 
transfers of value and the theories of unequal exchange which rely on them emerge as 
secondary phenomena, not primary causes, of underdevelopment’ (Shaikh, 1980, 
p.57). As a result, it can be concluded that 1) capitalism in its ‘free trade’ form in 
itself is a cause of uneven development and 2) free trade, in causing uneven and 
combined development, locks countries into further relations of unequal exchange.  
Free trade has been a key aspect in the uneven and outward extension of 
capitalist social relations of production. As Kiely remarks, the British empire of the 
nineteenth centurythe first period of capitalist outward expansion in Samir Amin’s 
understandingcan be understood as a case of ‘free trade’ imperialism. ‘What is very 
useful about the concept of ‘free trade’ imperialism is that it demonstrates how more 
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developed capitalist countries can exercise power over less developed ones, largely 
through “economic relations” (although these are always backed by state regulation)’ 
(Kiely, 2010, p.51). The post-World War II era, Amin’s second phase, was then 
characterised by the further expansion of trade in manufactured goods through 
successive rounds of agreements on lowering taxes within the framework of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Then, the GATT Uruguay round of 
negotiations, between 1986 and 1994 expanded the agenda of ‘free trade’ significantly 
(see Introduction to this volume). First, it culminated in the establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, which also included a strengthened 
dispute settlement procedure facilitating the monitoring and enforcement of 
agreements. Moreover, the GATT Uruguay agreement also included the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as well as an Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs). ‘The successive expansion of the area of “free trade” 
has constituted a movement from the classical international trade of material goods . . 
. to far-reaching liberalisation and deregulation and, subsequently, neoliberal re-
regulation of the economy’ (Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004, p.73). The WTO Doha 
round of negotiations, launched in 2001, was intended to deepen this expansion of the 
‘free trade’ agenda further and complete ‘unfinished business’ especially in the area 
of services and public procurement but also agriculture. Due to increasing resistance 
to these developments, the WTO Doha negotiations have stalled. This does not mean, 
however, that the ‘free trade’ strategy has halted. In view of the problems at the 
multilateral level, both the European Union (EU) and the United States have 
increasingly engaged in bilateral strategies of ‘free trade’ agreements. These strategies 
include the expanded trade agenda and are a tool to achieve what has been impossible 
within a multilateral setting (Choudry, 2010). In other words, the expanded trade 
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agenda including now also intellectual property rights, investment and services, 
initiated by the WTO and pursued through bilateral channels, is yet another way of 
integrating peripheral spaces into the global political economy in order to ensure the 
continued accumulation of surplus value in core spaces of advanced capitalism 
through unequal exchange, while deepening the prevailing spatial conditions of 
uneven development. 
One noticeable example in this area is the EU’s Global Europe strategy, 
launched in 2006 (Hilary, 2014). ‘This openness is no longer simply about tariffs. 
Securing real market access in the twenty-first century will mean focusing on new 
issues and developing tools of trade policy to achieve the types of opening that make 
a real difference’ (European Commission, 2006, p.6). Public services have been 
especially singled out as an area where the EU intends to open up new markets. 
‘Services are the cornerstone of the EU economy. They represent 77 percent of GDP 
and employment, an area of European comparative advantage with the greatest 
potential for growth in EU exports’ (European Commission, 2006, p.8). By opening 
up developing countries to high productivity service corporations, some form of 
‘development’ will result but the question to pose is for whom? as the old problem of 
combining elements of advanced technological progress with the lagging effects of 
older backward elements remains. As a result, processes of uneven and combined 
development are further extended while peripheral capitalist spaces become locked 
into new relationships of unequal exchange. Peripheral capitalist space is yet again 
transformed in the latest extension of the capitalist social relations of production 
through the ‘second wind’ of ‘free trade’, which is perhaps now entering a third phase 
of capitalist expansion beyond the two periods identified by Amin, which is to be 
discussed in the conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
This article has attempted to sketch the relationship between capitalist outward 
expansion linked to processes of uneven and combined development and relations of 
unequal exchange in order to assert the particular role of ‘free trade’ in these 
processes. Capitalist production, organised around wage labour and the private 
ownership of the means of production, is characterised by a crisis tendency. Outward 
expansion around uneven and combined development is thereby a key dynamic as to 
how such crises are overcome, albeit temporarily. Because capitalist expansion has 
historically taken place within an already existing international states-system, state 
spaces have become locked into relations of unequal exchange, in which surplus is 
transferred from peripheral spaces to advanced capitalist spaces due to different 
productivity rates. This outward expansion, as Amin reminds us, has taken place in 
several successive phases, reconstituting these relations of unequal exchange in new 
ways. So-called ‘free trade’ has always played an important role in the outward 
expansion of capitalism. Initially, non-capitalist spaces provided new markets to 
absorb surplus goods from centres of advanced capitalism. During the second phase, 
GATT negotiations facilitated further trade in manufactured goods. It is, however, the 
most recent period, in which the trade agenda has expanded, reaching into areas of 
financial investment and service provision, thereby adopting its most significant role. 
This situation heralds a new, third period reconstituting the relationships of unequal 
exchange between spaces of the global political economy as a result of continuing and 
intensified uneven development. It is these dynamics around the expanded free trade 
agenda, which Kiely refers to as a new phase of neoliberal, free trade imperialism 
(Kiely, 2010, p.188). It is these structuring conditions, with which labour movements 
around the world are today confronted. 
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 The implications for labour and its potential agency of resistance against 
further restructuring are complex. Precisely because capitalist expansion has been 
uneven, labour movements in different state spaces find themselves in contrasting 
locations within the global political economy. Already in the 1970s, Mandel remarked 
that ‘it is hard to deny that American workers participated to a certain degree in the 
benefits of U.S. imperialism’s monopoly of advanced industrial productivity 
(technology)’ (Mandel, 1970, p.25). Thus, while some labour movements may feel 
that further capitalist expansion is in their interest and albeit only at first sight, others 
realise the detrimental impact the expanded ‘free trade’ agenda implies. When 
Trotsky analysed the way Russia was integrated into the global political economy 
through processes of uneven and combined development at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, he wanted to understand the structural preconditions of the Russian 
situation and in what way it may facilitate revolutionary upheaval (Trotsky, 
1929/2004, p.152). The element of combined development is crucial in this respect, 
since it brings together the most advanced social forms with backward social forms, 
resulting in unstable state spaces, forming an explosive situation (Davidson, 2010, 
p.13). States supervising military-bureaucratic regimes of passive revolution in 
peripheral spaces, therefore, are potentially a more fertile ground for revolutionary 
uprisings than states in advanced capitalist centres (Cox, 1983, p.171; Davidson, 
2010, pp.17-18). Increasing numbers of labour strikes in China and the collective 
power of opposition forces in public spaces such as Tahrir Square in Cairo, Syntagma 
Square in Athens and Taksim Square in Istanbul are testimony to such an 
understanding of the situation. 
 Additionally, we need to take into account the new, transnational organisation 
of the social relations of production as indicative of globalisation. Transnational 
production sectors, which bring workers from different state spaces together in one 
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production process, may provide fertile ground for actions of transnational solidarity. 
Public services, on the other hand, continue to be predominantly organised at the 
national level. Nevertheless, the threat of privatisation and liberalisation as part of the 
new ‘free trade’ agenda affects them all in similar ways. Unsurprisingly, the Public 
Services International, the trade union organising public sector workers at the 
international level, has been very active in co-operation with other social movements 
in the resistance to neoliberal restructuring (Bieler, 2012, pp.374-6). The latter 
especially also includes resistance against the extended ‘free trade’ agenda through 
work in networks such as Our World Is Not For Sale (http://ourworldisnotforsale.org/, 
25 July 2012). As forewarned with striking contemporary resonance by Rosa 
Luxemburg, capital in its attempts to ensure surplus accumulation through outward 
expansion is also continuing to undermine its very own conditions of reproduction, 
whether that is in the form of global war, ecological disaster, and/or rising discontent. 
Capitalism, ‘becomes a string of political and social disasters and convulsions, and 
under these conditions, punctuated by periodical economic catastrophes or crises, 
accumulation can no longer go on’ (Luxemburg, 1913/2007, p.447). It is the very 
challenge of developing non-capitalist spaces and pathways out of crisis that now 
necessitates further transnational solidarity. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                          

 Paper presented at the workshop on ‘Trade Unions, Free Trade and the Problem of 
Transnational Solidarity’ at the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice 
(CSSGJ), University of Nottingham (2-3 December 2011). We are indebted to the 
workshop participants and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments 
on previous drafts.  
1 
See, for example, Emmanuel 1972 and, for a critical engagement with Emmanuel, 
Shaikh 1979, 298-99 
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